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DLD-253 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 06-4593
________________
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH DAVIS,
          Appellant
   v.
STEVON A. BISHOP, 98919;
DEWEY BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT;
SAM MACKERT, Chief of Police;
TOWN OF DEWEY BEACH
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-0583)
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
May 31, 2007
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 19, 2007 )
________________
 OPINION
________________
PER CURIAM
Christopher Davis appeals an order entered by the United States District Court for
     Defendants Dewey Beach Police Department, the Chief of Police, and the Town of1
Dewey Beach filed one motion to dismiss, and defendant Bishop filed another.
     The District Court gave the parties thirty days in which to “present all material2
pertinent to a Rule 56 motion.”  All parties except Officer Bishop responded.
2
the District of Delaware dismissing his civil rights complaint with regard to some claims
and granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants with regard to others. 
Because the appeal lacks arguable merit, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
I.
In his civil rights action, Davis claims that Steven Bishop, a patrolman in the
Dewey Beach Police Department, used excessive force while arresting him, in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.  Specifically, Davis alleges that Bishop flung Davis off the
hood of Bishop’s police car and forcibly cuffed and “manhandled” Davis while arresting
him.  He also asserts that Bishop did not allow him to use the bathroom and failed to
properly search him and discover the lighter in his pants pocket, which later “became a
cause of endangerment” to Davis.  Davis alleges that the Dewey Beach Police
Department, the Chief of Police, and the Town of Dewey Beach are responsible for
“hiring and supporting” grossly incompetent and violent officers.   
In response to the complaint, the defendants filed motions to dismiss.   Because1
the motions included matters outside of the pleadings, the District Court converted them
into motions for summary judgment, and gave the parties the opportunity to respond.  2
The District Court found for the defendants on all claims; this timely appeal followed. 
     Despite converting the defendants’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary3
judgment, the District Court dismissed some claims – Davis’s improper search claim, his
claim concerning not being permitted to use the bathroom, and some of his claims against
the Chief of Police – for failure to state a claim.  Although the District Court should have
analyzed defendants’ motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, we need
not remand for such consideration.  Davis had adequate opportunity to respond to the
motions for summary judgment, but failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
with regard to any of the claims.  Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on all claims.
3
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II.
To determine whether a law enforcement officer’s conduct violates the Fourth
Amendment, a court must evaluate the reasonableness of the conduct in light of factors
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.  See Carswell v. Borough of Homestead,
381 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2004).  We also consider the duration of the officer’s action,
whether the action took place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the
suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the officer must contend at
one time.  See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496-97 (3d Cir. 2006).  In conducting this
determination, courts must balance the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” versus the countervailing government interests
at stake.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
We agree substantially with the District Court’s analysis.   According to the3
4parties, Davis was driving down the center of a two-lane road when he was stopped; he
did not initially respond to the police car siren, and eventually backed into a private
driveway.  Davis smelled of alcohol and failed two field sobriety tests; instead of
attempting to perform a third sobriety test, Davis sat on the hood of the police cruiser,
and did not obey Bishop’s instruction to get off the hood of the car.  Although Davis was
initially handcuffed, Bishop had removed the cuffs to allow Davis to perform the field
sobriety tests.  As the District Court pointed out, although Officer Bishop admitted to
having “flung” Davis from the hood of the police car, a reasonable jury could conclude
that the force used was reasonable given that Bishop was alone and was confronted with
an “uncertain situation” with an individual who was uncooperative and appeared to be
intoxicated.
Davis’s conduct after he was removed from the hood of the car undermines his
claims about being roughly handcuffed and arrested, and not being permitted to use the
bathroom.  After being removed from the hood of the police car, Davis clung to (in his
words) or wrestled with Officer Bishop.  Bishop required the assistance of two additional
officers to handcuff Davis.  When placed in the back seat of the police vehicle, Davis
disobeyed instructions to stay where he was, removed his seatbelt two times, and
eventually kicked out the rear window of the vehicle.  While being transported into the
hospital, Davis attempted to bite another officer.  Under these circumstances, we agree
with the District Court that Bishop’s actions in connection with Davis’s arrest do not
     Although Davis alleged that he suffered nerve damage because he was handcuffed too4
tightly, he did not support this claim in his response to defendant’s motions.  However,
even assuming Davis’ allegation to be accurate, there is no indication that Davis
complained, or that Officer Bishop ignored obvious signs of his discomfort.  Nor did he
show that the handcuffing resulted in damage that required medical attention.  See Gilles
v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2005).  
5
violate the Fourth Amendment.  4
 The District Court also rightly rejected Davis’ novel theory that Bishop’s
“improper” search (during which the officer failed to confiscate a lighter that Davis
possessed) violated Davis’s rights by allowing Davis the opportunity to later set a fire in
his holding cell.  Davis’s claims against the other defendants fail for the reasons
articulated by the District Court.
Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal lacks merit, and we will dismiss it
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
